United Nations A/CN.10/PV.186

General Assembly

Official Records

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

186th Meeting
Tuesday, 19 April 1994, 3 p.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Mongbe . . . . . (Benin)

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

General exchange of views on the three substantive agenda items *(continued)*

The Chairman *(interpretation from French):* I wish to congratulate the first speaker on being here on time.

Mr. Mazlan (Malaysia): My delegation would like to extend to you, Sir, our congratulations and good wishes on your appointment as Chairman of this important Commission. Our congratulations are also extended to the other members of the Bureau and to the Chairpersons of the three Working Groups. It is our belief that with you at the helm, and with the support of the Bureau members and the Chairpersons, our meetings will achieve their objectives.

The issue of disarmament is as old as the history of mankind. Since man learned how to produce weapons, there have been efforts, in one way or another, towards arms control and disarmament. In the course of this century the human race has gone through two devastating wars. Towards the end of the latter, a most destructive and terrifying weapon, the nuclear weapon, was introduced. The threat of nuclear war was the hallmark of the cold-war period and, despite its end, the danger of nuclear and other types of war continues to afflict humanity.

Deficiencies in confidence and confidence-building mechanisms among nations have resulted in countries continuing to arm themselves to enhance their security. Malaysia continues to believe that the question of disarmament is closely linked to the question of confidence-building, peace-building, peace-keeping and socio-economic development. These linkages and interlinkages are vital ingredients in our continued quest for international peace and security.

Malaysia has been consistently committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament. We believe that this Commission has an important role in the achievement of that objective. It is our hope that the end of the cold war will indeed help overcome all mistrust and contribute towards achieving the Commission's objectives.

My delegation is pleased that this year the Commission is beginning to consider a new agenda item, entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". We believe that the inclusion of this item is timely, as the General Assembly itself is expected to reassess the working of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms this year. We believe that transparency in armaments is a vital pillar of confidence-building.

We note with satisfaction that the Commission managed to conclude consideration of the item on "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" at its last session. Member countries should now take into consideration the recommended guidelines in the efforts to institute disarmament in their respective regions.

My delegation always believed that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms through resolution 46/36 L was only the first step in an effort to establish a comprehensive conventional arms

94-85432 (E)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178, and incorporated in a copy of the record. Any corrections to the records of the meetings of this session will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the session.

register. Transparency in armaments brought forth by the existence of this Register will no doubt increase confidence among neighbours and complement other confidence-building measures in existence, such as transparency in military expenditures.

In this context, senior officials of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), meeting in Bangkok from 7 to 9 March 1994, agreed that the United Nations arms Register constituted an important building block for transparency and confidence-building among States, and that efforts should be made to ensure effective implementation of the concept. To this end, the senior officials agreed in principle to the concept of a regional arms register. As an initial step, officials will begin to study the format and the criteria of the United Nations Register and its relevance to the region.

As regional efforts continue, the United Nations should begin the review of the Register by expanding the types of weaponry whose transfers should be submitted for inclusion in it. The Register should also be expanded to include conventional weapons acquired before its establishment and weapons acquired through indigenous production. The Register should also in the future be expanded to include information on research and development of new weapons systems. Likewise, urgent consideration needs to be given to the utilization of the Register in a manner which would discourage the proliferation of the illicit arms trade, one of the central issues that the Commission will address this year.

The illicit arms trade has the potential to disrupt international peace and security. In the present international situation, it is more than ever imperative that the illicit arms trade be curbed. The growth of organized crime, narco-terrorism and deep and malignant social problems provides fertile ground for the illicit arms trade. The arms merchant will stop at nothing to circumvent lax national and international regulations to further his objectives. We therefore support the proposal of the delegation of Colombia to establish guidelines for more responsible conduct in international arms transfers, with the aim of eradicating the illicit arms trade.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be my delegation's first priority. We are extremely distressed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as characterized by recent events, notwithstanding the end of the cold war. Although there have been positive developments recently on the question of nuclear weapons in the republics of the former Soviet Union, efforts have to continue towards the safe disposal of these weapons.

My delegation firmly believes in the value of the work of the Disarmament Commission in this area, and will cooperate with the other members of the Commission to continue to build on the work done last year. The General Assembly's decision last year to give the Conference on Disarmament a mandate to negotiate a universal, international and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty was a step in the right direction. We believe such a treaty would complement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in advancing towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. We are also hopeful that there will also be an opportunity to include on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, as was proposed last year.

Malaysia remains deeply concerned over the situation involving the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT. The situation has heightened tension in an important part of the globe, one that is contiguous to our region. My delegation looks forward to the early and peaceful resolution of this problem.

As we look towards 1995 and the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we must seriously look at how to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Recent developments obviously point to serious flaws in the NPT's non-proliferation regime. These flaws arise basically from the asymmetrical application of the rules to parties and non-parties to the Treaty, which, among other things, allows nuclear-weapon States to profit from the sales of nuclear materials, to the detriment of international peace and security.

It is therefore obvious that we should take a hard look at the NPT and its extension. In this context, my delegation would like to see a faster pace adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference. Malaysia believes that the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the unconditional commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons within a set time frame are two major factors which will determine the indefinite extension of the NPT.

My delegation was disappointed that at the last session we could not conclude the consideration of the agenda item on "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". We therefore welcome the continuation of its consideration this year.

We regret that the important advances of science and technology continue to be applied to the research, development and production of weapon systems that qualitatively and quantitatively perpetuate the arms build-up. The result is an arms race that nations can ill afford. Science and technology should be utilized to support disarmament, particularly in enhancing our ability to monitor and verify compliance with any type of disarmament agreement and to maintain international peace and security. The Commission should continue to strive to remove the remaining differences and to complete its work on this agenda item this year.

Another issue that we should address under this agenda item is the question of transfers of so-called dual-purpose high technology. My delegation believes that a satisfactory arrangement should be included in the draft guidelines to allow the transfer of such technology while addressing the concerns of the countries of origin as well as the needs of the importing countries, particularly developing countries. Such transfers could be made conditional on the requirement that they be used only for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Niaz (Pakistan): It gives my delegation great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to see you presiding over this session of the Disarmament Commission. Your extensive experience in conducting multilateral meetings inspires confidence in us, and we hope will ensure a successful outcome of the Commission's deliberations. I wish to assure you of my delegation's complete support and cooperation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

The euphoria of the initial days of the post-cold-war period has faded. Multiple crises and conflicts continue to plague the world, reminding us of the long and arduous path that has yet to be traversed to attain the goals of international peace and security.

In this context the role of the Disarmament Commission acquires increased importance. It remains the only forum where Member States can deliberate on key security and disarmament problems and formulate broad guidelines on ways to address them. In the present troubled times we need to take full advantage of this forum. We can do so by formulating clear principles on which to base future action and by avoiding the tendency to obscure these principles by hedging them with unnecessary caveats and qualifications. It is in this spirit that my delegation approaches the issues currently on the Commission's agenda.

The agenda item on the process of nuclear disarmament is now in its final year of consideration. For a successful outcome of the deliberations on this item we need to agree on the principles that should underpin the process, the different levels at which the process should be implemented, and the broad elements that should be a part of it.

The objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons is often dismissed as unrealistic. It is argued that nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented or wished away, and that in a world of sovereign States it is inconceivable that the nuclear option will not be exercised by one or other State. A nuclear strategist has said that "the rigidity lies in the situation and not in the thinking". However, we are inclined to agree with those who contend that part of the problem does indeed lie with rigidity in thinking. The international community can choose either to accept existing security structures with their reliance on nuclear weapons, or to work towards building alternative structures. In the latter case a process would have to be initiated resulting in an international environment in which nuclear weapons become increasingly irrelevant. The aim would be to institute measures that decrease the perceived security relevance of nuclear weapons.

Before identifying the possible measures that would promote nuclear disarmament, it is essential to agree on the basic principles on which these measures should be based. These principles should include: non-discrimination - that is, there should not be different rules for different States or groups of States; uniformity - rules once made should be applied with equal vigour to all States; and reciprocal interest - an acceptable balance of mutual responsibility and obligations for nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

Based on those principles, specific measures can be recommended that, when applied in tandem at the global, regional and subregional levels, would lead to the gradual marginalization and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

At the global level there is a need for: efforts to promote the objective of nuclear disarmament as reflected in Article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) through the initiation of negotiations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the Conference on Disarmament; the early and successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test ban treaty; and the expeditious implementation of the START I and START II treaties.

Until the objective of nuclear disarmament is achieved non-nuclear-weapon States must be provided with unconditional and legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

At the regional and subregional levels there is a need to institute measures for nuclear non-proliferation in specific areas. In this context, the efficacy of a regional approach which promotes non-proliferation in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner is now unquestioned, as is evident from the regional non-proliferation regimes that are being instituted in Latin America, Africa and the South Pacific. The progress being made in these regions needs to be replicated in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

In the context of South Asia, Pakistan has consistently endeavoured to address this problem and has put forward numerous proposals for non-proliferation on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis. These include simultaneous accession to the NPT; simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards; mutual verification of nuclear facilities; a bilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty; and a bilateral declaration of adherence to non-proliferation. Unfortunately, these proposals have yet to evoke a positive response.

Pakistan is also ready in principle for a multilateral dialogue to address the interlinked issues of non-proliferation, arms control and regional security in South Asia. For far too long South Asia has lived within a dangerous and worsening security environment. It is time to find comprehensive solutions to the interrelated problems of proliferation, conventional arms build-ups and bilateral disputes so that the present and future generations of South Asia can be provided with security, greater economic opportunity and a better quality of life. The settlement of outstanding disputes on the basis of the United Nations Charter and decisions of the Security Council is imperative for reducing tensions in this sensitive region.

The deliberations on the second substantive item on the agenda of the Commission, "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", ought to be concluded this year.

Free access to scientific and technological know-how is an essential prerequisite for the socio-economic development of all States. Curbing the flow of such know-how not only impacts negatively on the countries that are denied access but also has economic costs for the States that impose the restrictions. There appears to be growing realization of this fact. Hopefully, this realization will lead to the replacement of certain existing inequitable regimes by broad-based, multilateral agreements on the transfer of science and technology.

Essential guidelines on the specific issue of access to technology for peaceful nuclear energy programmes already exist and are contained in General Assembly resolution 32/50, which declared:

> "All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs". *(resolution 32/50, para. 1 (b))*

The resolution also stressed:

> "All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy." *(Ibid., para. 1 (c))*

The principle implicit in that resolution - that is, the equal right of all States to acquire technology for peaceful purposes - should apply in all scientific and technological fields. There is, of course, a need to prevent the use of science and technology for non-peaceful purposes. However, this must be done within the context of universal, equitable and non-discriminatory arrangements.

The final substantive issue on our agenda, the question of illicit arms transfers, will be considered by the Commission for the first time this year. Our delegation is looking forward to an initial exchange of views on this important and exceedingly complicated issue. We have read with great interest the document prepared by the Colombian delegation on this issue. We find ourselves in agreement with much that it contains, especially its emphasis on the need for States to coordinate efforts to combat the menace of illicit arms transfers. We are confident that our discussions on this question will pave the way for the formulation of viable guidelines by the Commission at subsequent sessions.

Given the emergence of new and grave threats to international peace and security, it is essential that the Commission conduct its deliberations with renewed vigour and the utmost seriousness. Warnings of coming anarchy at the global level may perhaps be overstated. Nevertheless, there is undeniably an increasing number of security and arms-control issues that demand in-depth analysis and consideration. The Commission is the forum

that is best placed to undertake this task. By successfully concluding its deliberations on two critical issues and by initiating a constructive debate on the third item, the Commission will have proved that it is up to the task.

Mr. Hou Zhitong (China) *(interpretation from Chinese):* First of all, allow me warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the current session of the Disarmament Commission. I am confident that your outstanding leadership will guide this session to success. I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil, for his contribution to the previous session of the Commission.

I should like to present China's principled positions on the Commission's three important agenda items and related issues to share our views with the representatives of other countries.

Nuclear disarmament has a direct bearing on world peace and security. For more than half a century mankind has been living under the threat of nuclear war. As a result, early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons has become a common goal of humanity. The Commission has been considering the agenda item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" for several years, and it will consider it again this year.

Since the last session there have been some new developments in this field. Following the agreement reached between the United States, Russia and Ukraine on the disposition of the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament has again ratified the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), thus creating conditions for its implementation and for the ratification by the United States and Russia of START II. China welcomes these new developments. Meanwhile, people cannot but note that, even after these Treaties are fully implemented, the United States and Russia will still possess the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals in the world. They should therefore continue to fulfil their special responsibilities in nuclear disarmament in accordance with the relevant resolutions and documents of the General Assembly.

The important negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were finally started at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva at the beginning of this year. Under the leadership of Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, delegations from various countries have held substantive negotiations on some aspects of the treaty. Proceeding from its consistent position of support for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has actively participated in the negotiations. The Chinese Government supports the early conclusion of this treaty and will work with other countries in an effort to attain this objective no later than 1996. The Chinese Government fully understands the desire of the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and believes that a total ban is a step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

China supports the following demands of the international community. The future treaty on a nuclear-test ban should be comprehensive and should ban all forms of nuclear-weapons test explosions that release nuclear energy, so as to leave no leeway for further development and improvement of nuclear weapons. The treaty should provide a strict scope of prohibition and clear definitions. It should enjoy genuine universality and possess an effective verification mechanism. The treaty must ensure equal sovereignty among States parties and strike a balance between rights and obligations, preventing any abuse of verification for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of the States parties and damaging their security interests. Furthermore, the treaty should not hinder international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China will continue to contribute to the early conclusion of such a treaty.

China has never evaded its responsibility in nuclear disarmament, but, rather, has made tireless efforts to that end and important contributions to this process. From the very day it first came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly undertaken the unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances. It has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, China has on many occasions called on other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment and to conclude an international convention on this issue at an early date.

The Chinese Government recently launched another initiative, by formally proposing in December last year that China, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France initiate negotiations as soon as possible on such a treaty by each submitting a draft treaty to the other four countries. This draft treaty would stipulate that the five

countries undertake to support the conclusion of a treaty on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other in any circumstances.

China believes that, in today's new world situation, the conditions are ripe for the five nuclear-weapon States to conclude such a treaty. This, in parallel with the negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, would greatly reduce the danger of nuclear war, help to enhance the security of all countries - non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States alike - and create favourable conditions for the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the acceleration of the nuclear disarmament process. This important proposal by China has received a positive response from Russia, and China hopes that the other three countries will respond similarly so that the treaty can be concluded at an early date.

This year we will continue to consider "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". This item involves two major issues: non-proliferation and the promotion of international cooperation in science and technology. How to handle these questions is a major task facing the international community. The principles and recommendations adopted by this Commission after full discussion will provide guidance in this regard. China has consistently advocated the prohibition and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has adopted stringent and effective export-control measures in accordance with the provisions of relevant international treaties.

At the same time, China supports the reasonable demands of many developing countries and believes that non-proliferation efforts should not hinder international technological cooperation, much less be used as an excuse by a small number of countries to block the acquisition and development of science and technology by the vast number of developing countries for peaceful purposes. We have noted that the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), a product of the cold war, was formally dissolved at the end of March and that some countries have expressed their willingness to relax their export controls on certain related materials and technology. At the same time, we have also noted that some countries concerned are planning to set up a new export-control regime. It is our hope that all the consequences of the cold war will be completely removed and that no action taken will constitute an obstacle to the enhancement of international economic and technological cooperation.

Owing to the differences on certain paragraphs, we failed to adopt a final document on the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" at last year's session. However, thanks to the joint efforts of all delegations, we did manage to formulate a Chairman's paper, which is, on the whole, balanced and the bulk of which is acceptable to all sides. The delegation of China supports the use of the Chairman's paper as the basis for this year's deliberation. We hope that a consensus can be reached on a document on this basis.

This year we have a new item on our agenda, namely, "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of December 1991". The issue of international arms transfers is a focal point of international attention. Therefore, it is important that the Commission deliberate on this issue and try to come up with certain principles in this regard.

All countries enjoy the legitimate right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and all have the right to acquire and maintain the legitimate means and capabilities for this purpose. Meanwhile, for the sake of maintaining international peace and security, countries should not seek armaments that exceed the reasonable needs of self-defence. International arms transfers should, therefore, be conducive to the strengthening of the self-defence capabilities of the recipient countries. They should not be detrimental to the peace and security of regions concerned and the world as a whole, or be used as a means for interfering in the internal affairs of other sovereign States. China has consistently adopted a prudent and responsible attitude towards arms transfers. Its arms transfers are small in quantity and have always been in conformity with the foregoing principles. China calls upon other countries to exercise similar self-restraint.

China has always been opposed to unrestricted arms transfers in the world. It is obvious that the key to solving this problem lies in the political will of a small number of countries with the most advanced defence industries and the most arms exports. Large-scale sales of arms exacerbated regional tensions and endangered regional and international peace and security in the cold-war era, the legacies of which still exist today. It is regrettable that even after the cold war there are still countries which, in total disregard of regional and international peace and security and even in flagrant violation of the obligations they have undertaken in accordance with international agreements, export large quantities of arms to other regions or even to a part of another sovereign State in their self-interest and for other ulterior motives. China calls upon the international

community to make joint efforts to urge these countries to exercise self-restraint and stop such irresponsible transfers.

At present, illicit arms transfers are still rampant and have become a grave threat to the unity, stability and security of some countries. The international community must take immediate and concerted action to act resolutely and forcefully to stop illicit arms transfers. The Chinese Government has adopted stringent arms import and export control measures. No organization or person is allowed to import or export arms without the permission of the Government. The Chinese Government is prepared to work with other countries to explore ways to strengthen such controls, so as to eradicate completely illicit arms transfers - a crime which endangers international peace and stability.

In the next three weeks, this Commission will deliberate on three agenda items and adopt documents on two of them, as planned. This obviously is both an important and a difficult task. The delegation of China will cooperate fully with the Chairman and all other delegations in working to accomplish this task, so as to make a contribution to international peace and security.

Mr. Nkurlu (United Republic of Tanzania): May I at the outset associate myself with other delegations that have spoken before me and congratulate you, Sir, on your well-deserved election as Chairman of this substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We look forward to the successful conclusion of this session, under your guidance and able leadership.

The ongoing dramatic developments in the disarmament and arms-control processes are a welcome dimension of the international system. The prevailing moratoriums on nuclear testing and the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) have added a new fillip to the disarmament cause.

We are particularly pleased to see a staunch supporter of the CTBT, Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, at the helm of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban. This new chapter, if properly nurtured, offers us yet another opportunity to enhance stability and common security in the world. My delegation sincerely hopes that the Ad Hoc Committee will work relentlessly and expeditiously to achieve a treaty before the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference. Tanzania is very keen about this aspect because we view the CTBT as a crucial first step in facilitating full compliance with the provisions of the NPT.

Nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons, is one of the two items that it is envisaged to conclude during this session.

With the demise of super-Power rivalry, covert activities and secrecy have given way to increasing transparency. As a result, several world leaders, scientists and journalists have come out in the open and conceded that a nuclear war cannot be won. Whatever merits for nuclear war existed before, they can no longer serve a useful purpose in the current situation. This trend constitutes a positive aspect - namely, that nuclear war must never be fought. Regrettably, some countries still harbour ambitions of producing nuclear weapons, while some others continue to have stockpiles of these weapons which are not worth keeping for the purposes for which they were developed.

It is against that background that Tanzania views, with great concern, the treatment that major nuclear-weapon States have accorded the item on nuclear disarmament in the Disarmament Commission. While my delegation looks forward to concluding this item during this session, we strongly feel that it is high time the international community started thinking seriously about linking the CTBT and the extension of the NPT with the nuclear-weapons Convention.

Although article VI of the NPT stipulates the need for parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith with the objective of achieving complete nuclear disarmament, we consider that it is not explicit enough to be a viable mechanism for eliminating all nuclear weapons. Since this article has been in existence, not only have we witnessed the multiplication of nuclear weapons - enough to destroy the world many times over - but countries have continued to import large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium for so-called peaceful purposes, thus creating more potential nuclear States. It is therefore imperative to complement article VI of the NPT with a larger convention with the sole objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the world over.

In this regard, we are glad Africa is now preparing to join other world nuclear-free zones in conformity with the 1964 Organization of African Unity Declaration, which called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa. This is a great accomplishment in the field of nuclear and regional disarmament, particularly for the African continent, considering that South Africa, under the apartheid regime, had developed nuclear arsenals. We call upon other regions with similar conditions to emulate this

noble move in an endeavour to intensify global efforts towards a safer and more stable world.

Tanzania notes with regret that the item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and related fields could not be concluded last year due to fundamental conflicts of interest between the North and the South in regard to the transfer of technology with military applications. As long as this item continues to touch on complex and sensitive issues, the supplier and the recipient should endeavour to bridge their differences and work out a consensus to regulate the transfer of sensitive technology. Indeed, the end of East-West ideological confrontation has provided the world with the opportunity to take advantage of the great strides in science and technology to move from the tradition of producing deadly weapons to a much needed orientation towards economic and social emancipation.

As this item enters it fourth year of deliberation by the Disarmament Commission, we are confident that, in spite of their differences, delegations will take advantage of the significant progress made last year, with so many consensual formulations tentatively agreed, to move forward to accomplish this difficult task ahead of us.

The failure during the last session of the First Committee to reach consensus on the draft resolution on the chemical weapons Convention confirmed our worst fears that the Convention poses serious obstacles to the efforts of developing countries to acquire material and technology for the development of chemical industries. We continue to insist that the acquisition of industrial technology for peaceful use is a right of every nation, and reiterate that it is unfair and, indeed unethical, for United Nations disarmament bodies to deliberately impede the enjoyment of such a right. Conventions negotiated under the auspices of United Nations organs are supposed, in the spirit of compromise, to facilitate and not to obstruct the transfer of technology to countries which need it. Nevertheless, we still hope that the Preparatory Commission in The Hague will come up with a satisfactory solution to this burning issue to allay our fears.

The transfer of conventional weapons in a world fraught with regional and ethnic strife is an issue of increasing importance for the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. Over the years the illicit arms trade has increased considerably, endangering the world's fabric of tranquillity and its socio-economic development. Although this item is not intended to be discussed in detail during this session, suffice it to mention that collective responsibility is a prerequisite for preventing the spread of conventional weapons. In this respect, it is the duty of Member States, particularly those dominating the world arms market, to reinforce their national systems of control and vigilance in regard to the production and transportation of these arms. We pledge our continued support for and cooperation with you, Sir, and other delegations to ensure the success of this session.

Mr. Sucharipa (Austria) *(interpretation from French)*: I am very happy indeed to see this Commission, to which we attach great importance, meeting under your capable leadership, Sir. We believe this is a strong indication that our work will be successful.

I should also like to request the Brazilian delegation to convey to Ambassador de Araujo Castro our gratitude for the effective manner in which he conducted the deliberations of the Commission in 1993.

(spoke in English)

As a global forum which allows for the participation of all countries represented in the United Nations, the Disarmament Commission responds to the accepted principle that the responsibility for furthering disarmament and for enhancing international security cannot be restricted to a small group of key countries. Indeed, all States have to play their distinctive and constructive role in order to secure the balance and sustainability of the process. We are well aware that the Commission's democratic nature bears great significance for the elaboration of concrete guidelines and recommendations as well as for their universal implementation. Thus the consensus rule, while often requiring an arduous search for areas of agreement, does indeed benefit the final application of the guidelines and recommendations which reflect the existing common denominators of the collective awareness and political will of the international community of States.

The Austrian delegation shares the positive assessment of previous speakers regarding the reformed concept of the Commission. We support the streamlining of the agenda and the focused consideration of a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, as well as the continuous improvement of its working methods. With the addition of one new item to this year's agenda, the Commission took a first step to implement the decision of its 1992 organizational session to move its agenda to a three-item, phased approach. To my delegation, this concept of taking up a new item each year while concluding the deliberations on one item after it has been on the agenda for three years seems appropriate as a further step

to rationalize the work and enhance the efficiency of the Commission.

Previous speakers have commented on the unquestionable progress of multilateral disarmament efforts during the period since the end of the Cold War. Important global and regional disarmament agreements concluded during the last few years signal a turning point in the history of disarmament negotiations. START II will eliminate the multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, generally considered the most destabilizing category of strategic arms; the chemical weapons Convention provides for the total elimination of chemical weapons within 10 years; the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the 1992 CFE-1A Agreement both aim to reduce armaments and personnel in the area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

Yet, one look at the political reality, be it the ongoing tragic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Rwanda, leads us to pose the question: has the post-cold-war world really become a much safer, more stable environment for everybody than the old bipolar system which we had become accustomed to and for which applicable managing structures had been developed? Obviously, the answer to this question is "No".

To adequately utilize the opportunities provided by the post-cold-war era, we will have to develop new concepts and improved skills to respond to the present challenges, which are rooted in the change in the very nature of conflicts and threats. Thus the former conflict between the two antagonistic blocs of a bipolar world no longer dominates our strategic thinking. In fact, contemporary conflict theory has to take into consideration that today conflicts do not result from antagonistic-bloc interests. With most of the ongoing wars being domestic, intra-State conflicts, our perception of threat has shifted from an emphasis on external threats to territorial integrity to focusing on the destabilizing potential of internal threats, the root cause of most of the devastating ongoing conflicts.

These developments have necessitated the broadening of the concept of international security, which is no longer determined exclusively by military matters, but is also determined by economic, social, ethnic, environmental and human rights dimensions and by the complex relationships between those issues. The fragmentation of well-structured blocs and clear-cut interests, the global dimension of these newly perceived threats to international security and the non-military nature of many causes of conflict have, among other things, two profound practical consequences for the disarmament process.

First, the traditional culture of negotiating agreements between polarized spheres of interest will have to be modified and adapted to the needs of a far more disorderly world with numerous new actors; and, secondly, the shift in interests and the fragmentation of conflicts and threats require a new global cooperation of all countries to define common security interests.

The Disarmament Commission is in a position - maybe a unique position - to respond to the new challenges regarding its structure and its work. Thus, the adopted guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters will facilitate the development of confidence- and security-building measures, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated, especially in view of the new nature of conflicts. The agreed guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament emphasize the growing recognition of the interrelationship between global and regional aspects within the context of global security, as well as the relevance of regional efforts to stabilize and balance military forces, as demonstrated by ongoing efforts within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Vienna-based Security Forum.

The three items on this year's agenda are equally relevant. Working Group I, which is mandated to conclude, during this session, its deliberations on the "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", will thus deal with a question of undiminished relevance. The conclusion of the START II agreement, the Conference on Disarmament negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the forthcoming negotiations on the prohibition on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should facilitate progress in this Working Group. The deliberations will also be influenced by the question of non-proliferation, the complexity of which has been highlighted by the preparatory process for the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference. In this context, my delegation, like others, welcomes the accession to the NPT of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia as non-nuclear-weapon States, and hopes that Ukraine will do the same in fulfilment of its commitments to the Lisbon Protocol. We also strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with the NPT safeguard regime and to admit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to its nuclear facilities.

The indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime and an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remain priority issues for Austria. Together with the prohibition on the production of fissile material and the question of "negative security assurances", these issues form a complex package of different interests. In order to reach consensus on the question of nuclear disarmament, Working Group I will have to give balanced attention to all the different aspects of this issue.

Working Group II is expected to conclude, in the fourth year of deliberations, the challenging item of "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". We welcome in this context the Chairman's non-paper, which is a summary of the 11 November consultations. While it reflects the present stage of the deliberations, it also suggests alternative formulations which might help to bridge remaining differences. Developments since last year's session, such as the Conference on Disarmament's consideration of related issues, the report of the group of experts on verification and the two relevant resolutions at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly might influence this year's work.

Working Group III will take up the new item of "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991", an item to which our delegation attaches particular importance. Convinced that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons and their uncontrolled proliferation constitute a considerable threat to peace and international security, Austria supported the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. We hope that this year's preliminary deliberations on the item, as agreed upon, will produce a solid basis for work during the remaining sessions.

In conclusion, I would like to add an organizational suggestion. While considering the working schedule and how best to use the time allocated to the 1994 substantive session, we should take into consideration the quantitative as well as the qualitative aspects of the utilization of time. While parallel meetings double the amount of time available, they also pose considerable problems to all delegations. Small delegations will have to decide which meetings they will not follow, and larger delegations, which will be represented in parallel working groups by different members of their delegations, will very often face the problem of communication. This seems to have proved counterproductive in the last stage of the drafting in at least one of last year's Working Groups. My delegation therefore welcomes the revised programme of work, as proposed to us by the Bureau, for the initial week of this session and hopes that the pattern of successive meetings of the Working Groups will hold up during the remaining weeks.

The Chairman *(interpretation from French):* I welcome the concluding words of the representative of Austria on the reorganization of our work. The Bureau has done its best, with his participation, and I hope that we will be able to adhere to the new programme, which is more reasonable. That should be a source of pleasure to all delegations, especially the smaller ones, such as his and mine.

Mr. Cardenas (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish):* On behalf of my delegation, I should like to extend my congratulations to you, Sir, whom I consider to be a good friend, and to the other members of the Bureau elected for the 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission.

I should like to begin by referring to the item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons". We appreciate the working document circulated by the delegation of Ukraine, which is intended to serve as a framework for possible conclusions and recommendations in this area. This year the Disarmament Commission will complete consideration of this item, whose scope and complexity oblige us to try to consolidate recent trends and events in this area, a number of which have made a positive contribution to the dynamic development of international relations.

The concrete and substantial progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation in recent years on agreements to reduce nuclear arms was acknowledged by the international community in resolution 48/75 B, adopted without a vote last December.

The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, has taken up the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which is one of the priority objectives in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Argentina has committed itself to active participation in the negotiations under way in Geneva. Moreover, technicians from my country will take part in the activities of the Group of Seismic Experts.

My region is marching auspiciously towards the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will ban nuclear weapons from Latin America and the Caribbean. This will be a historic achievement.

Following our Parliament's endorsement of the Treaty last year, the Argentine Republic presented the pertinent instrument of ratification last January to the Government of Mexico, which is the depositary country.

It is worthwhile recalling that Argentina's active commitment to non-proliferation is also evinced by the quadripartite safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The agreement was ratified in timely fashion by my country.

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials is an important, fully functional body in Rio de Janeiro. Through it, all the safeguards of the common system of accounting and control are fully operative and in force.

The steps my country has taken in the field of non-proliferation were a prelude to President Carlos Menem's official announcement of his decision that the Argentine Republic should accede in the near future to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In another area, I wish to place on record our concern over the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in certain settings.

All States have the responsibility and the obligation to contribute to the process of easing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security. For these reasons, we consider that the non-proliferation regimes should always be respected, strengthened, improved and broadened.

My country attaches considerable importance to the full application and observance of international agreements and other obligations freely entered into by States, especially the comprehensive safeguards agreements entered into with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Failure to respect those commitments jeopardizes world and regional stability.

From a clear position of active commitment to a policy of non-proliferation, my country supported the decisions reached by the IAEA Board of Governors on 21 March to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to allow the IAEA to carry out immediately and fully all the inspection activities requested and to comply fully with its safeguards agreement. That appeal was reiterated in the statement issued by the Security Council on 31 March, contained in document S/PV.3357. We hope the opinion of the international community will be respected.

This year, for the first time, the Disarmament Commission will take up the subject of international arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H. The tendency towards greater transparency in international arms transfers took shape in the creation, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the Register of Conventional Arms, which my country resolutely supports.

The provision of information on military matters contributes to the creation of an atmosphere of greater trust between States, both regionally and internationally, and lessens mistrust, resentment and, in general, the chances of conflicts breaking out.

The promotion of transparency in arms transfers takes place within the broader context of so-called confidence-building measures. In this respect, I should like to recall that last month my country hosted a gathering of governmental experts on security and confidence-building measures convened by the Organization of American States. At that meeting they studied, among other items on their agenda, the latest advances in the field of confidence-building measures within the framework of the United Nations.

In the study of the question of international arms transfers, we must bear in mind that the right of States to maintain armed forces for the purpose of defence, and to provide them with the necessary equipment, is clearly rooted in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 51. We consider that such defensive needs should be fully in keeping with the maintenance of international peace and security and regional stability. It is clear that in dealing with this problem we must strike a proper balance between not only considerations of a strictly military or security nature, but also those relating to commerce and economy.

With regard to measures taken by our Organization, we consider it essential to have strict compliance with arms embargoes established under Security Council resolutions. Such embargoes, compliance with which is obligatory for

all States, tend to de-escalate conflicts and help in the search for peace.

By the same token, in order to support international stability and peace, we consider that the restrictions on arms transfers to zones of tension is appropriate. Such measures are preventive in nature, working directly against the outbreak or escalation of conflicts. As a possible objective in the treatment of this issue, the Disarmament Commission could, in our view, try to identify criteria or guidelines for the transfer of conventional arms.

On another front, we understand the concerns of those countries that warn of the destabilizing perils of the illegal arms trade. Our understanding of the term "illegal arms trade" is that it refers to trafficking that takes place in contravention of provisions of national or international law. In this context, we are grateful to the delegation of Colombia for the presentation of document A/CN.10/184, which will be the subject of detailed consideration and analysis in the relevant Working Group.

As to the question of sensitive technologies and military hardware, the Argentine Republic regulates their transfer in accordance with the agreements to which it is a party and by means of regulations requiring advance authorization for exports. By a decree of 9 April 1992, Argentina established a strict regimen of controls over external sales of nuclear and missile-related material, equipment, technology, technical assistance and services, as well as chemical substances that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. The decree, found in document A/47/371/Add.2, was promptly circulated by my delegation. That set of regulations led to the creation of the Commission for the control of sensitive exports and military hardware, which is now in full operation.

We believe that following the constructive debate in the Disarmament Commission in recent sessions, we should make every effort to produce a substantive report on the item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The positions of all countries have been made sufficiently known, leaving us with the task of defining the final aspects of a list of guidelines and recommendations that could be sent to the General Assembly for its consideration. My delegation is always willing to collaborate in that effort.

We feel that science and technology are tools that can have a positive effect for international security, especially when they are linked with agreements on arms control and disarmament that are in full force and are fully applied. Scientific and technological advances have concrete applications in the conversion of military industries to civilian uses, as well as in verification.

Mr. Li Song Jin (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): May I first of all extend my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this important Commission. My delegation is confident that with your remarkable talents and rich diplomatic experience you will successfully guide the work of the Commission at its current session to the expected result. We also congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

With the end of the cold war, the wishes and expectations of the people with respect to disarmament and peace are increasing. There have been signs of positive progress in the efforts of the international community towards disarmament. However, political and military confrontation remain, and the production and deployment of a large quantity of weapons of mass destruction continue. This shows that the international community still has a long way to go in this field.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes the current session of the Disarmament Commission to conclude its endeavours to produce valuable recommendations and guidelines for the promotion of the process of nuclear disarmament by bridging the gap in the field of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation believes that at present the most urgent issue to be resolved in the field of disarmament and peace is the complete elimination of the large stockpile of nuclear weapons on Earth. The complete abolition of nuclear weapons is a matter of vital importance related to the fate of the non-nuclear-weapon States and their peoples. The issue of nuclear disarmament has been a most pressing matter for the international community in its disarmament efforts from the very emergence of nuclear weapons.

As early as the 1992 session, my delegation expressed its views on the item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons". It is our view that the priority issue in facilitating the process of nuclear disarmament is that nuclear-weapon States should make clear their will to eliminate completely all nuclear weapons and should set forth a timetable in that regard.

A comprehensive and complete nuclear-test ban is an issue to be resolved in the field of nuclear disarmament; it

is essential for the prevention of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, my delegation believes that the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament will conclude its negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty prior to 1995.

It is a unanimous demand of the developing countries that nuclear-weapon States should give up the outdated doctrine by which they justify the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war and provide legal assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation holds that all foreign nuclear weapons deployed in other regions, and in particular in non-nuclear-weapon States, under the pretext of deterring war must be unconditionally withdrawn.

The non-nuclear-weapon States had the expectation that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would contribute to the nuclear disarmament process and to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, contrary to their expectations, even after the establishment of the NPT the production of nuclear weapons continues, a new generation of nuclear weapons has been developed, and the number of nuclear warheads has increased manyfold.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have demanded that necessary amendments be made to correct the inequality of the NPT at the forthcoming 1995 Review Conference. In that regard, my delegation considers that the main purpose and provisions of the NPT should reflect demands related to eliminating all nuclear weapons, banning all export of fissile material for nuclear weapons and providing legal guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Then nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would have equal obligations under the NPT, which would make a practical contribution to promoting the nuclear disarmament process.

The item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" is of particular significance today. Given the situation in which the successes of science and technology are being misused for military purposes, it is necessary to offer recommendations and guidelines on the role of science and technology at the earliest possible date. Despite new changes in international relations, scientific and technological achievements and large quantities of resources are being misused for the arms race and for the production of the means of war, menacing the survival of mankind, while outdated constitutional mechanisms, relics of the cold war, obstructing international scientific and technological exchanges still remain. The valuable results of science and technology and the social wealth created by mankind must be duly used for the purpose of peaceful economic development and the people's welfare.

The international community established a regime for international arms transparency with the expectation that it would contribute to confidence building. Since the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, exports of large quantities of modern weapons have not decreased, and technology related to the production of sophisticated weapons continues to be transferred at the international level. There is great concern over the fact that the Register is further encouraging the arms race rather than serving the aim of confidence-building.

My delegation is of the view that the Register of Conventional Arms should be further developed by banning all exports of military equipment and weapons and their transfer, in particular in regions in which political and military confrontation is serious. The Register should also list all foreign weapons and nuclear weapons deployed in other countries.

Some delegations have mentioned in their statements the "nuclear issue" of the Korean peninsula. My delegation would like once again to clarify the stand of my Government in this regard. Out of its sincere desire to achieve a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue at any cost, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has honestly fulfilled its obligations pursuant to agreements concluded. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea received inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and provided them with all positive cooperation so that they could carry out their inspection, sufficient to maintain continuity of the safeguards in conformity with the agreement concluded on 25 February this year in New York between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

The United States, however, sought an unreasonable quarrel, alleging that the result of the inspection was unsatisfactory. It, further, reversed the New York agreement.

We deem it necessary to refer to the course of the working-level contacts held more than 10 times between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America in New York. In the course of these contacts, the United States recognized that the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea has special status under the NPT, and agreed on the holding of a limited inspection, but not a routine or ad hoc one, by retreating from its earlier insistence on inspections pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, it recognized that the working-level contact with respect to the exchange of special envoys initiated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been ruptured due to the South Korean side and agreed to resume working-level contacts by retreating from its earlier insistence on carrying out the exchange of special envoys. Furthermore, the United States agreed on a third round of talks, to be held on 21 March in Geneva, indicating that if IAEA inspection were accepted the talks would open with no reference to the result of the inspection.

The United States, although it had agreed with the DPRK on the steps to be taken in simultaneous action, acted impractically and showed lack of trust by not doing what it had to do and finally reversed the agreement. This cannot be justified in any way - legally or morally. It can be construed only as showing that the United States has no intention of resolving the nuclear issue through negotiations, but is trying to take advantage of the talks to stifle the DPRK.

It would seem that the United States thought that holding the third round of talks would lead to the failure of its efforts to stifle the DPRK. Consequently, it further attempted to exploit the name of the Security Council to advance its stifling policy.

The United States announced that it would resume the "Team Spirit" military exercises. It is now deploying Patriot missiles in South Korea and sending anti-aircraft weaponry to the sea near the Korean peninsula. The war scenario written by the United States military has been completed and revealed.

Historically, the United States has justified military action by pronouncing a "diplomatic solution" before launching aggression. It is becoming increasingly clear that its agreement on holding talks with the DPRK and on the simultaneous steps to be taken, as well as the announcement of the joint statement, was nothing but a deceptive trick to justify military action. Future developments in the current grave situation on the Korean peninsula will depend not on the DPRK but on the United States.

The issue of the DPRK's peaceful nuclear-power industry, which was developed 30 years ago, has been taken up by the United States now because it wants a pretext for stationing American troops in South Korea even after the end of the cold war. At the same time, the maintenance and strengthening of United States troops in South Korea is a result of the American strategy to increase its influence in and domination over the Asia and Pacific region and to stifle the DPRK.

The United States must abandon its policy of playing power politics, a relic of the cold war, and withdraw its troops from South Korea, when its nuclear weapons deployed there will automatically be pulled out. Therefore, the withdrawal of United States troops and the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula are inseparable.

If other Western countries are truly interested in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, they should not try to force the DPRK out of the Treaty by backing the United States policy of stifling the DPRK; rather, they should encourage and support a solution to the nuclear question through the DPRK-United States talks.

Pressure can never be a solution. If the United States truly intends to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations, it should remove its nuclear threat and give up its hostile policy towards the DPRK by pulling out its troops and nuclear weapons.

It is our firm will and policy to respond to dialogue with dialogue and to strength with strength. It is our consistent policy to resolve the nuclear issue by peaceful means. We will not oppose settling the nuclear issue through negotiations if the United States ends the international pressure campaign and re-establishes the foundations for the DPRK-United States talks.

Mr. Chirila (Romania) *(interpretation from French)*: It is a great pleasure for my delegation warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the important office of Chairman of the 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission. Our best wishes also go to the other members of the Bureau. We welcome with pleasure Mr. Davinic, Acting Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as well as the other representatives of the Secretariat. My delegation would like to extend special thanks to Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil for the way in which he guided the work of the Commission in 1993. I assure you of the complete cooperation of the Romanian delegation.

(spoke in English)

It is generally recognized that, despite the new challenges familiar to all of us, the overall international context provides us with new opportunities for developing

a comprehensive and constructive dialogue in the field of arms control and disarmament. Multilateral disarmament forums are expected to take appropriate advantage of this opportunity. The current session of the General Assembly, especially the debates of the First Committee and the resolutions adopted on its recommendation, have provided important analyses and useful guidelines in this regard. The forty-eighth session of the General Assembly stressed, more than ever, the intimate connection between international security as the fundamental *raison d'être* of the world Organization and arms control and disarmament as means to carry on this endeavour. Arms control and disarmament are only ingredients of the much more comprehensive concept of international stability and security.

Today, following the disintegration of the bipolar structure and the end of the cold war, the world no longer faces the need to stabilize a situation of nuclear confrontation. But the stability has become a more complex objective as it has to be pursued in a variety of specific contexts. The integration of arms control and disarmament within international security, at both the regional and global levels, is in total harmony with the logic of the times. The revival of the United Nations in accordance with its natural vocation, the increasing role of the General Assembly and especially of the Security Council, and the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other regional structures confirm the growing ascendancy of the political factor over the military.

In this framework, it is worth mentioning the interest expressed by Central and Eastern European countries, including Romania, in being admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the recent "Partnership for Peace" plan, which is seen as a preliminary stage leading to full membership of the Alliance. Romania was the first to join officially the "Partnership for Peace", in January, marking a new stage in its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The basic changes in strategic perceptions in the post-cold-war era have offered solid ground for already important developments in the field of arms control and disarmament. The START agreements for the elimination of strategic arms have made the nuclear threat recede dramatically. We look forward to rapid progress towards the full implementation of the START commitments, including the Lisbon Protocol.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention (CWC) has proved the indispensable role of multilateral disarmament endeavours in the post-cold-war era. This Convention could offer a model for other disarmament agreements. Romania intends to conclude the Convention's ratification process before the end of this year and to join all common endeavours towards making it universal.

Favourable results in improving and strengthening the regime under another important disarmament agreement - the 1972 biological weapons Convention - have also been noted in the last two years. Romania actively participated in the efforts, including those at the experts level, aimed at strengthening the Convention's verification machinery and thus improving its implementation and effectiveness.

Still on the subject of the post-cold-war period, significant progress has been achieved on conventional disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) established a substantially lower level for each individual European country. We welcome the completion of the first reduction phase. The full implementation and integrity of the CFE Treaty remain fundamental to European stability and security.

At the same time, confidence-building measures have proved pre-setters for disarmament measures. Agreements such as the 1990 Vienna document and the 1992 open skies treaty made a large contribution to transparency, predictability and crisis management.

As for the future arms-control and disarmament agenda, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and appropriate control of conventional weapons should constitute priorities of the international community in the years to come. Future multilateral arms-control agreements and export-control regimes and other institutions such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should play major roles in restraining the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems. Romania will join other interested countries in promoting and establishing new measures better to control and prevent proliferation, and in general to refine a non-proliferation strategy. Romania is actively participating in a number of groups and regimes designed to develop responsible proliferation control. My Government has publicly committed itself to complying with the guidelines and the spirit of such international regimes; it is developing appropriate national regimes and legislation.

The heart of a global non-proliferation regime remains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), sustained by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national export controls. Owing to the very significant number of

recent adherents, the parties to the NPT reached the figure of 160, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Next year the States parties to the NPT will decide

> "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". *(General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex, article X, para. 2)*

The prospects for an indefinite extension depend upon the question whether the NPT is attaining its goals. Basically, two of the main goals - to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to encourage nuclear-arms disarmament - are being attained. Positive results have also been registered on the third main NPT goal - namely, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Romania firmly believes that the NPT should continue in existence indefinitely and unconditionally after 1995. Important assets in this respect will be the seizing of the existing opportunity to move towards ending the nuclear-arms race, the further reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, and the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which is now the subject of special attention in the Conference on Disarmament.

An important prospective area is the control of conventional weapons, the challenging issue of transparency in armaments, designed to contain and prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms in various parts of the world. As the President of Romania stated last June at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the overall aspects of transparency in armaments could be regulated through an international treaty of universal application setting up standards and procedures, as well as an appropriate implementation mechanism. Agreed guidelines to serve as an international code of conduct could be a first step to that end.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of transparency in armaments. Some 82 States, including Romania, submitted in 1993 data on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. This is a promising start, although broader participation remains essential. In our opinion, the Register could establish an international code of conduct for the purpose of controlling arms transfers and the activity of weapon suppliers, in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further. The establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a special committee on this subject is of particular significance in this respect.

Given its revised agenda and its rationalized procedure, the Disarmament Commission can be considered among the most up-to-date bodies of the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 48/77 A offers additional bases and inputs in this respect. Particularly encouraging are the appreciation shown for the work of the Disarmament Commission and the adoption by this body, at its 1993 substantive session, of the set of guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security. The endorsement by the General Assembly of this important document has great political and practical value. This is also, in our view, clear recognition of the present and future relevance of the Disarmament Commission and its work, as a universal forum providing all States the opportunity to participate in deliberations on arms-control and disarmament issues, thus involving and engaging States of all regions in this process of concern to the entire international community.

The agenda for this substantive session of the Disarmament Commission includes particularly sensitive matters, of obvious general interest. It offers an opportunity for this body to confirm that in the post-cold-war world the United Nations can play a more active and productive role in the field of disarmament and disarmament-related matters.

As for agenda item 4 - "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security ..." - if we want a meaningful and substantive conclusion on such a complex subject, realistic choices regarding the aspects and elements of a consensus and a constructive approach would be in order. Dialogue in this field is encouraged by changes and positive recent steps, especially following the additional initiatives aimed at nuclear-weapon reductions, the limitation of nuclear testing, and the recent adherence by a significant number of States to the NPT.

Agenda item 5 - "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" - offers good prospects, after three years of deliberations and negotiations, for the adoption of a substantive document in a field which, for the first time in the disarmament and disarmament-related forums, has been the subject of such comprehensive and thorough consideration. We hope that the work done so far, especially under the very able guidance of Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada in the drafting group at last year's session, will be concluded with the adoption by consensus of a document reflecting both the complexity and the implications of the issues involved.

As for the new substantive item on the agenda - "International arms transfers" - in our view it offers a timely opportunity for the Disarmament Commission to get involved in a domain of particular concern *vis-à-vis* the threats to stability and security at regional, subregional and even local levels. We think that the particular context of this item - namely, General Assembly resolution 46/36 H, dealing especially with the illicit international arms transfers - will not prevent us from placing and examining the subject in the broader context of the transparency and control of conventional armaments in general.

Finally, I share the views expressed by previous speakers concerning the importance of putting into practice our methods of work so carefully refined during the last two years, with the endorsement of the General Assembly. We consider this to be a matter of particular importance for ensuring the renewed practical efficiency of the work of the Disarmament Commission in the future.

Mr. Yoo (Republic of Korea): I would like to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission. Your capable and dedicated leadership will certainly ensure the success of our deliberations. We are also appreciative of the good support provided by the other members of the Bureau and the Chairmen of the Working Groups. And last, but not least, we would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Luiz Augusto de Araujo Castro for his outstanding role as Chairman of last year's session of this Commission.

The Disarmament Commission, as a universal body for disarmament affairs, has already recorded several important achievements in recent years. We are pleased to note that the Commission adopted "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters" in 1992, followed by the adoption of "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" in 1993. My delegation hopes that an equally positive outcome will result during this session, especially in the fields of nuclear disarmament and science and technology.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, significant progress has already been made. First, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty are currently under way in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. According to the report of the Chairman of the relevant Working Group, a rolling text is to be prepared during the second session of the Conference. Furthermore, there is a certain amount of optimism that the negotiations may be concluded this year. My delegation would like to take a moment to pay tribute to Ambassador Marin Bosch for his commitment and efforts in this regard. Secondly, my delegation wishes to recognize the action of the nuclear-weapon States in adhering to the moratorium on nuclear testing. Due to the strong cooperation which most of the nuclear-weapon States have demonstrated to the international community, the momentum is still going strong. We also note that the United States, Russia and Ukraine have concluded a trilateral agreement, which my delegation hopes will be fully implemented in the near future. And, thirdly, the Conference on Disarmament is in the process of having informal consultations for the cut-off treaty on fissionable materials.

Another welcome development has been seen in a regional context. In particular, my delegation commends the joint efforts of Argentina and Brazil to make their nuclear facilities more open and transparent, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

My delegation firmly believes that in today's world the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the only viable and practical means to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was an opinion shared by the vast majority of the international community during the work of the last two Preparatory Committees for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The Republic of Korea therefore considers that the vital importance of the regime must not only be fully acknowledged, but that the NPT must be extended indefinitely if the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the international community is to be achieved. Although there are lingering issues surrounding the NPT, the Republic of Korea is confident that they can be resolved if a cooperative spirit prevails.

In the future NPT regime, securing a cap for nuclear non-proliferation should be a priority. My delegation takes the view, however, that the other function of the system - providing assistance to the non-nuclear weapon States for the peaceful use of nuclear energy - should be further strengthened and guaranteed. For this very reason, the IAEA should be reinforced.

Regrettably, the Government of the Republic of Korea must report that no positive progress has been made in regard to the problem of the DPRK's nuclear programme. In reference to the Security Council presidential statement of 31 March 1994 on the North Korean nuclear issue, my Government would like to reassure the DPRK that its return to the NPT regime and the fulfilment of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are the most effective ways to ensure its own security.

As the Republic of Korea has repeatedly emphasized, we truly want peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula. As soon as the DPRK guarantees its nuclear transparency, we will do our utmost to strengthen the economic exchange programme in the spirit of co-prosperity. We are also prepared to help the DPRK improve its relations with the rest of the global community. We sincerely hope that the day will soon come when full nuclear transparency on the Korean peninsula becomes a reality.

Science and technology have two rather contradictory implications for international peace and security. Our indisputable purpose in bringing this issue for discussion here is to ensure the use of science and technology solely for the enhancement of international peace and security. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea Government supports the increased utilization of existing technology in the disarmament efforts of the international community, including the verification of disarmament agreements and the conversion of military production facilities for civilian purposes. In this regard, the ultimate establishment of a global verification system under United Nations auspices should be one of our goals.

At last year's session we held extensive discussions on four substantive matters regarding the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. My Government appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Peggy Mason, who played an important role in the success of the session.

While recognizing the substantial results from last year, my delegation feels that the discussion was much too broad. If we devote more concentrated attention to the agenda items of the current session, with specific regard to international security and disarmament and with an approach of balance between access to technology and non-proliferation commitments, the Commission cannot only sustain but also augment the achievements of past years.

As for the new agenda item for this session, the Republic of Korea Government expects to achieve significant results from our discussion of illicit arms transfers, and is confident that it can be recorded as another accomplishment of the Commission in the future. Discussing this issue will provide another opportunity to complement ongoing efforts for enhanced transparency in conventional arms transfers. The illicit transfer of arms is a grave problem which can have a highly detrimental effect on both regional and international peace and security. We know how difficult it is to define illicit arms transfers and, for that matter, to curb them. However, since we have decided to tackle this difficult problem, my delegation would like to endorse the suggestion made by the European Union that we should focus our attention on the conceptual framework at this initial stage. We are fully prepared to participate in the discussion of this matter, and wish to thank the Colombian delegation for its working paper, which will serve as an excellent basis for future discussion.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to say that we are ready to play our part to ensure that this session reaches a most successful outcome.

Mr. Shoukry (Egypt) *(interpretation from Arabic)*: Please allow us, Sir, warmly to congratulate you on your election to lead our present session and to congratulate the other members of the Bureau. The Egyptian delegation is certain that thanks to your diplomatic experience we will be able to achieve success in our work. I would like to pay tribute, likewise, to Ambassador de Araujo Castro for his excellent work as Chairman in presiding over the last session.

The work of disarmament has been constantly moving towards greater effectiveness and greater rationalization since the report on "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission" in 1990. During our last session we adopted the necessary recommendations on the subject of regional disarmament, and the preceding year we concluded our consideration of the question of "Objective information on military matters". It remains for us to consider the questions of nuclear disarmament and the role of science and technology, which we should conclude during this session. We will thus have concluded our consideration of the questions on the agenda of the Commission before the rationalization. We will then be able to consider the new question relating to the illicit transfer of arms and to cover other points, according to the agenda, to consolidate the progress of disarmament.

On nuclear disarmament - the most important question - we have received a working paper prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group. The delegation of Egypt stresses the need to conclude the study of this question in order to make recommendations reflecting international consensus on the importance of nuclear disarmament.

Our participation in achieving this goal will only be fully achieved when the non-nuclear countries have security guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by those that have them. We also need to define commitments by the nuclear Powers so that they assume their responsibilities in this regard in the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter *vis-à-vis* countries that renounce the nuclear option by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so that they respect the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system.

We will have to stress that these security guarantees must come within the context of a Security Council resolution updating resolution 255 (1968) or take the form of a specific international treaty. The inclusion of such principles, making the NPT universal and progress in the ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, in the context of our Commission's recommendations, will contribute to consolidating the NPT, particularly on the eve of the Conference on its review and extension.

The fact that we did not reach a compromise concerning the agenda item on the role of science and technology at the last session and our decision to continue its consideration this year adds a new burden to us in our attempt to complete consideration of outstanding items at this session. But our general approval of ideas and principles during our last session makes me optimistic about achieving positive results during the present session.

No doubt the necessary progress will only be achieved with a balancing of the legitimate interests of all members, and for this equitable conditions have to be guaranteed facilitating the transfer of the most up-to-date technology. We acknowledge the importance of control measures with regard to dual-use technology, but this should not be used as a pretext for halting the flow of technology to the developing countries. I would like to stress once again that the relevant norms should be characterized by total transparency, that they should be defined openly on a global scale and that their application should be general and equal for all, in order to gain the necessary credibility and successfully achieve our goals.

I should also like to stress the importance of the new agenda item on illicit arms transfers, which constitute a danger to contemporary societies, because of the transfers' links to organized crime and terrorism. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the delegation of Colombia for its efforts to include this item on our agenda, as well as for the valuable document it has made available on the subject.

In conclusion, I should like once again to state that my delegation is fully prepared to cooperate with you, Sir, to facilitate the successful achievement of the objectives of our session, and I offer you my best wishes for success.

Mr. Pashovski (Bulgaria): I take pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, on your election to chair the Disarmament Commission for 1994. The delegation of Bulgaria is confident that the Commission will achieve tangible results under your skilful and able guidance. The outstanding contribution to the work of this Commission made by your predecessor, Ambassador Luiz de Araujo Castro of Brazil, provides us with a good basis for productive work at this session. I should like to wish success to the other members of the Bureau as well as to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups. Our words of appreciation go also to the Secretary of the Commission, Mr. Lin, and to the staff of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

At the outset, I should like to express the satisfaction of the delegation of Bulgaria over the success achieved during last year's substantive session of the Commission with the adoption of the Guidelines and Recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security. Bulgaria attaches particular importance to regional and subregional efforts to enhance arms control and disarmament as well as to confidence- and security-building measures. We hold the view that regional and subregional steps can effectively contribute to strengthening the security of individual States and to increasing stability in their respective areas, thus contributing to global disarmament and security.

My country is an active member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of other European institutions related to the stability of the European continent, such as the Council of Europe. This year Bulgaria will be the first post-Communist country to assume the presidency of the Committee of Ministers of that body, which is one of the oldest in Europe.

In accepting that post, we assume that our receiving it is an acknowledgement of Bulgaria's painstaking efforts in the process of transition to democracy and a market economy, as well as of its civilized and good-neighbourly Balkan policy. My country has put forward for consideration various measures related to security in the Balkans, including steps aimed at reaching a comprehensive solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Bulgaria supports initiatives related to the promotion of confidence-building, transparency and effective means of verification of various regional agreements, such as the

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies. We look forward to advancing the dialogue on these and other regional endeavours.

By virtue of its geopolitical situation, Bulgaria can contribute to security and stability in the vulnerable region of the Balkans. Bulgaria openly declares its readiness to enhance its cooperation - including full membership - with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its member States, and is ready to shoulder responsibility and act as a reliable partner of the Alliance. Our good bilateral relations and security cooperation with Greece and Turkey illustrate clearly our approach and intentions. It would be beneficial to both Balkan and European security if these relations could be developed further into cooperation between allies within NATO.

Guided by this understanding, Bulgaria recently joined the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, which in our view provides States willing to work together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with an equal opportunity and a starting point for establishing closer contacts with that organization. In our view, NATO has undergone significant evolution by reviewing its priorities and objectives, which was illustrated by the results of its summit held in January of this year.

I should like now to present briefly the views of my delegation on the work ahead of us at this session. The complexity and importance of the issue of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons determines its position high on the international community's agenda. Recent positive results achieved in the Conference on Disarmament illustrate the will of States to curb proliferation of such weapons and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. A comprehensive, effectively and internationally verifiable nuclear-test ban and an international agreement on a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes will be major steps in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in promoting nuclear disarmament.

The end of the cold war and the increased attention paid by the international community to the strengthening of the regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provide this community with opportunities for elaborating a common approach to the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, which include Bulgaria. My country expresses its satisfaction that at the first session of the Conference on Disarmament this year there was confirmation of the existence of good political will and prerequisites for the unification of the unilateral declarations of the five nuclear States.

It is my country's firm belief that all necessary efforts should be taken to ensure the success of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Bulgaria hopes that the international community will mobilize its resources and find a balanced approach to ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT, while preserving its potential in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, Bulgaria is of the view that the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be enhanced and that the Agency should be provided with all necessary resources by the international community so that it can successfully strengthen its safeguards regime, conduct special inspections and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council, as provided for in the Agency's Statute.

The role of science and technology in the context of international security is another topical issue on our agenda. The transfer of high technology has conceptual as well as practical importance in the new international environment, after the collapse of the bipolar global system.

In our view, the legitimate security and non-proliferation concerns of the international community have to play an important role in the establishment of a non-discriminatory regime for the transfer of sensitive items.

The elaboration of a set of guidelines, principles and procedures, the acceptance of which would guarantee a State access to sensitive technologies and products, is definitely in the interest of a large number of countries. Such guidelines, in our view, should envisage commitments by States to abide by the existing and effectively verifiable international agreements in the field of non-proliferation, as well as unilateral commitments to endorse the norms established by the existing international regimes for non-proliferation in their national legislation. An approach encompassing a system of internationally acknowledged mandatory norms and unilateral steps by States may, in the view of the delegation of Bulgaria, create an international environment and conditions in which military and strategic concerns will be met, without interfering with a mutually beneficial international transfer of sensitive items.

Bulgaria supports the current efforts to widen and enhance international cooperation in implementing the respective guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In our view, ways and means could be explored

to strengthen linkages between these suppliers clubs and the respective specialized agencies of the United Nations system.

My country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. We are also looking ahead to the possibility of joining the Australia Club and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Towards achieving this goal, Bulgaria has established a comprehensive national system of export control covering all sensitive areas, including nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related items, in line with the existing international standards. Access to high technologies will enable my country - as well as others, I am sure - to address successfully numerous problems arising in the process of transition to democracy and a market economy.

In conclusion, I should like to offer a few thoughts with regard to the new substantive item on our agenda, that of illicit arms transfers.

By definition, such transfers exclude the opportunity of transparency and have a destabilizing effect on regional and global peace. We see merit in addressing this issue in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve a result which will contribute to a better understanding of the threat that illicit arms transfers represent and provide the international community with a set of guidelines and recommendations to help States in their efforts to put an end to the illicit transfer of arms. The working paper contained in document A/CN.10/184, presented by the delegation of Colombia, contains valuable ideas which represent a good starting point for discussion.

At this juncture I should like to point out that Bulgaria's policy regarding prevention of the illicit transfer of arms and cooperation with the United Nations is in full harmony with resolution 46/36 H and other relevant United Nations documents.

Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran): Allow me at the outset, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau on your well-deserved election to your respective posts. It is a great pleasure for me, Sir, to see a diplomat of your stature steering the work of this important forum in the United Nations disarmament machinery.

In line with the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the role of the Commission in examining various issues and challenges in the field of global and regional disarmament, in submitting recommendations and in promoting the implementation of relevant decisions of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, continues to be of great relevance. It is thus a source of satisfaction that the Commission has taken steps in the last few years to improve its methodology and rationalize its work, thereby enabling itself to deal more effectively and expeditiously with the challenges in this field.

My delegation also notes with satisfaction that the Commission succeeded last year in finalizing its work on a regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security. The document produced in that connection, despite some shortcomings, is of high value and significance, and can contribute substantively as a sound basis for our common efforts in this regard. Being located in a region that has been the scene of aggression, expansionist tendencies, destabilizing conflicts and rivalries, the arms race, massive arms transfers and foreign military presence, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a genuine appreciation of the need for such regional approaches. We have in the past, and particularly in the past several years, put forward a number of proposals and ideas in various international forums, ranging from the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the Middle East, formation of security and cooperation arrangements in the Persian Gulf area, and reduction of military expenditures, including agreement on a ceiling for international arms purchases and transfers to each country in the area, to the establishment of a forum in the Persian Gulf area, where the concerns and suggestions of the States of the region on security and armaments could be aired and debated.

My delegation also welcomes the inclusion of the new item on the illicit arms trade on the agenda of the Commission. This issue, which has very direct and close links with international drug trafficking as well as with terrorism, has had serious consequences for the security of a number of States around the globe. Like terrorism and the drug menace, the illicit arms trade is an international problem requiring solutions based on international cooperation and a common, unified approach. The Commission can thus play a very constructive role by establishing guidelines and pinpointing areas of mutual effort and cooperation in this field.

Let me now turn to agenda items 4 and 6, which are to be finalized at this session.

It is evident that the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of elimination of nuclear weapons, remains the most important priority in the field of disarmament. It

is also self evident that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament, including the destruction of all existing nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the obvious fact that no non-proliferation scheme will succeed so long as nuclear disarmament is not clearly in view should not be overlooked. Moreover, with the cold war now behind us there no longer remains any justification - if there ever were one - to continue to maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons, much less to develop new ones.

Despite all this, discussions and negotiations continue to be centred around the reduction of nuclear arsenals rather than their eradication. We have limited ourselves to praising and welcoming the conclusion of the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the two strategic arms-reduction treaties (START I and START II) - which are, to be sure, important and welcome achievements. We have even allowed ourselves to discuss issues such as the likelihood of scenarios in which conventional confrontations escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, a debate which not only negates the objective of nuclear disarmament but also runs counter to the very foundations of negative security assurances.

Thus, a sincere and profound review of the reasons and justifications for the persistence of nuclear armaments in the world is necessary. States that hold massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons have at least a moral obligation to explain to the international community what remains the logic behind maintaining nuclear weapons. The world has the right to know whom these weapons are intended for and whom they are now to deter. It is quite shocking that no major country possessing nuclear weapons has come forward in this regard. At the same time, these countries seek unlimited extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, making it absolutely clear that even the ultimate goal remains non-proliferation rather than the eradication of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States should make a solid commitment to destroy their entire nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems within a time-bound framework. The minimum that can be expected is a declaration of the intention to do so, and the specification of a target date. That date should be finalized during the NPT Conference in 1995, when the Treaty comes up for review and possible extension. This, along with the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty prior to 1995, would greatly enhance the chances of that Conference.

The 1995 Conference will also provide an exceptional opportunity to strengthen the process of nuclear disarmament by redressing the imbalances in the Treaty, which seem to have exempted the nuclear-weapon States, at least according to their own interpretation, from the prohibition on further manufacture of nuclear weapons and on their vertical proliferation. In this context, binding commitments on the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes can be incorporated into the NPT; this would also serve the purposes of resolution 48/75 L adopted by consensus on this subject at the last General Assembly session.

A few other steps are also required in order to strengthen the process of disarmament through the NPT and allow its continued applicability and thus its extension. Probably the most important and fundamental flaw in the international non-proliferation regime is the application of double standards, which has led to the selective proliferation of nuclear weapons. This has not only gravely undermined the authority and relevance of the NPT, but has also had serious ramifications for international and regional peace and security and has retarded regional initiatives. In our region, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel has foiled all efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, despite the General Assembly's unanimous and continuous endorsement over the past two decades of the idea originally put forward by my country in 1974.

Even worse, the threat posed by Israel's refusal to join any international nuclear regime and to accept the NPT or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards coupled with the pursuit of a discriminatory and dangerous policy of selective proliferation - rather than non-proliferation - by nuclear-weapon States, has increased the potential for the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and led to non-accession by a number of important States of the region to international instruments prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, most notably the chemical weapons Convention (CWC).

A related issue is the need for minimum incentives for compliance and a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to serve the interests of all States parties. Today, after more than two decades, the imbalances between the Treaty's obligations and responsibilities have been seriously aggravated. Even the existing provisions of the Treaty have been implemented only selectively.

As a result, it can be reasonably argued that countries that have remained outside the Treaty have had their free ride while those that have joined have been deprived of the

minimum incentives: those related to peaceful use and to their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to be assured of the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

When extension of the NPT is discussed, it is imperative that nuclear-weapon States extend the obligation they undertook in the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties to all States parties to the NPT. In the meantime, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, based on the obligations undertaken under the Treaty, States that renounce the nuclear option by joining the NPT must be granted full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the relevant provisions of the Treaty have not been implemented, particularly as regards the developing States parties to the NPT. I will address this issue in broader terms under agenda item 6, to which I now turn.

Today, a number of technologies that have the potential completely to transform methods of warfare are in advanced stages of development. A new generation of sophisticated nuclear and conventional, non-lethal and "brilliant" weapons are under development, with destabilizing effects on the global security situation. This requires a genuine and serious international effort to devise safeguards and monitoring mechanisms to ensure the prohibition of the further utilization of science and technology for developing new weapons systems. Advances in science and technology should be directed towards use in the field of disarmament and mainly towards multilateral verification of disarmament agreements.

A related concern is that of ensuring that high technology be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Many areas of science and technology with primary and vital applications in health, industry, agriculture and other civilian fields may also have possible military utility. Their apparent apprehension over this has led some developed States to exercise unilateral and group export restrictions on the transfer of material and technology to States parties to international disarmament instruments, most notably the NPT, the CWC and the biological weapons Convention.

This practice ignores the fact that the incentive for becoming parties to these instruments and complying with them is the assurance given to the have-nots that they will gain secure access to the related materials and technology for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the relationship between science and technology and non-proliferation is obviously a common international concern, and thus the solution also should be an internationally negotiated one. Unilateral and private club restrictions, which are mostly arbitrary and politically motivated, simply exacerbate an atmosphere of suspicion.

In the area of nuclear technology, it has become absolutely evident that material and technologies related to peaceful use are intended to be denied to most NPT signatories save a few - even those outside the NPT - that fall in the category of political and military allies. Countries that do not have the best relations with some powerful nuclear States suffer particularly, no matter how scrupulously they observe the provisions of the Treaty and the related safeguards. The discriminatory approach in the implementation of the provisions related to peaceful use has even been formalized in the creation of bodies outside the Treaty, such as the London Club.

In this respect, while there should be an understanding that countries which have chosen not to join the NPT in order to keep their option of access to nuclear weapons must be treated differently than those which have made commitments, we need incentives for the have-nots and disincentives for the haves. The NPT should therefore be extended in such a way that all countries would find it clearly in their interest to join. The incentive must include a binding commitment to what has already been provided for in the Treaty for peaceful use by all contracting parties. Furthermore, a mechanism must be set up to ensure that commitments related to peaceful use are realized and all discriminatory measures are lifted.

The same is true for the Australia Group in the field of chemical and biological materials and technology. Here, the Australia Group was to remove limits and barriers on the export of chemical materials perceived as having dual use and hence to restrict limitations to those agreed upon in the Convention after years of negotiations. Regrettably, the early indications are otherwise. I will cite only two examples. At the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Australia has proposed model legislation which includes export controls on chemicals beyond those prescribed by the CWC. The intention, clearly, is to justify and legalize through legislation the continuation of the Australia Group. Also, as all members are aware, during the last session of the General Assembly the Western countries refused the inclusion of a phrase from the Convention concerning technological cooperation

for peaceful use in their draft resolution, even at the cost of its withdrawal.

There is already a growing concern, as a result, that the enthusiasm of many countries about signing the Convention will give way to reluctance, or at least indifference, when the time comes for ratification and implementation. With the chemical weapons Convention coming into force, the export regime set forth by the Australia Group should be abandoned, as has been envisaged in article XI of the Convention.

The arbitrary limitations on the transfer of material and technology has also already had negative effects on discussions to formulate verification mechanisms related to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Several months of discussion and work in the framework of the governmental experts verification group (VEREX) to produce ideas on verification ended with strong expressions of concern by developing and non-aligned countries. They rightly stated, on the basis of past experience with the non-proliferation Treaty, the chemical weapons Convention and other treaties, that they would not go along with an intrusive verification system as it might once again hamper development in the field of peaceful use in another very significant area. They seek, this time, real guarantees and commitments for removal of all restrictions, as well as transfer of material and related technology by the producing countries, before a new verification system is considered.

In conclusion, it would be appropriate for the Commission to complete its work on agenda item 6 by agreeing on guidelines which would, on the one hand, ensure prohibition of further utilization of science and technology for the development of new weapon systems and the putting in place of the necessary monitoring mechanisms and, on the other, guarantee that restrictions on the transfer of materials and technology would be governed only by internationally negotiated conventions and treaties, and in the absence of such treaties would be fully transparent and non-discriminatory and reduced to the minimum level necessary, with the sole objective of enhancing international security at lower levels of armaments.

Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation congratulates you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to preside over the 1994 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are confident that under your able leadership our deliberations at this session will be fruitful. We extend similar congratulations to the other officers of the Commission.

The international political milieu is changing. Some of these changes have had a positive impact particularly on the disarmament process. Sadly, however, some of these changes have been negative. Wars have continued in many parts of the world. Ethnic hatred and xenophobia have supplanted the old clash over ideology. Ethnic rivals imbued with a sense of new nationalisms have acquired weapons to pursue their claim over territory and to governance. This has had dire results.

For many States, security is as elusive and distant as it was during the era of the cold war. A new and more troubling development is the brazen disregard for international institutions created to mediate and settle international conflicts. Parties in conflict have turned peace-keepers into enemies and disregarded United Nations-negotiated disarmament measures. Yet, despite regional conflicts, the last five years have seen remarkable disarmament agreements such as the START I and START II Treaties. These bilateral agreements have been complemented by such multilaterally negotiated agreements as the chemical weapons Convention. Indeed, multilateral disarmament processes have been revitalized. Member States should reinforce these achievements by using multilateral forums to conclude all disarmament agreements.

The Disarmament Commission reflects and benefits from the positive changes in the international system. For two years in a row, the Commission was able to reach agreement on its agenda items slated for conclusion. The Commission has thus reaffirmed its usefulness as a deliberative body. This year the Commission has the opportunity to prove its vitality once again by concluding successfully the agenda items entrusted to it.

Of all the items before the Commission, perhaps none is as important as the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the almost half a century since man discovered this awesome weapon, efforts have been made by many Member States to ensure that this weapon is never used again and that the development of new weapon systems is not only reduced but eliminated.

This has been and should remain the collective goal of humanity. There has certainly been recognizable progress in the process of nuclear disarmament. This progress was enumerated in the earlier part of this

statement. However, notwithstanding this remarkable development, there is certainly a long way to go - the work of the Commission on the process of nuclear disarmament has remained essentially static. The Commission should this year advance its discussion on the item. It should do this by building upon the positive developments in the Conference on Disarmament, which has commenced negotiation on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We should at this session agree to the format of a draft text which could be the subject of negotiation in the next few years if the Commission should decide to extend the consideration of this crucial agenda item.

There are many reasons why the consideration of the item should be extended. In the first place - and this was stated earlier - is its importance. Secondly, the discussion of the item will offer Member States yet another forum to exchange views in formal session on nuclear issues while important negotiations are taking place in various forums.

Science and technology are interlinked tools which man has used to prolong life and improve its quality. At the same time, the tools have been used to destroy life and the ecosystem. The application of science and technology for military purposes consumes resources which otherwise could have been used to alleviate the social ills that plague mankind, the most telling of which is poverty.

The international community is challenged by a new mode of terror and insecurity fuelled by the use of illegally acquired arms. There is hardly any part of our globe where illegal arms are not being used to subvert Governments, promote terror and spread the network of organized crime.

The agenda item dealing with illicit arms transfers is therefore timely. There is a need, however, not to limit our discussions to illicit arms transfers, but to look at the item in a holistic manner, because the line between legitimate and illicit arms transfers is not clearly defined. Different nations have different criteria for their exportation or importation of arms, and unless we first harmonize the different criteria it may be difficult to identify illicit arms transfers. Arms are always dangerous and they often bring death and destruction. There is therefore a need for circumspection in dealing with them.

If we have no code of conduct or guidelines for international arms transfers, we have no moral justification to labelling some deals as illicit. The paper submitted by Colombia is a very good basis for our work here, and we are much obliged to that delegation for it. In this first year, however, we must concentrate on how to identify illicit arms, and on the scope to be covered in the discussion of the item.

The agenda item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and other related fields was scheduled for completion at the 1993 session. However, because of the progress made on the draft text being negotiated, the Commission decided to extend until this year final consideration of the item. We are thus presented again with another opportunity to agree on guidelines and recommendations on it. We have all laboured very hard in the last three years to ensure broad agreement. The text before us is a useful document that hopefully will be the basis of agreement. In this context, we wish to commend Ms. Peggy Mason, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, for her sustained efforts in nurturing the text so far. We hope that all delegations will be forward-looking and will not seek to renegotiate those areas on which agreement has been reached. Any effort to renegotiate agreed paragraphs and sentences will jeopardize the whole exercise and set us back years. Rather, we should focus our efforts on contentious areas so as to arrive at an early understanding.

Nations should not be hostage to the technology they have created. Accordingly, much emphasis should be placed on the beneficial application of science and technology for mankind. Science and technology should not be used to perfect instruments of war and destruction, and the fruits of scientific research and technological progress should be shared without discrimination.

Mr. Sychou (Belarus) *(interpretation from Russian)*: The delegation of the Republic of Belarus would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to your high and responsible post and to express our confidence that under your skilful leadership the Disarmament Commission will be successful in carrying out its tasks. We should also like to congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

Belarus attaches great importance to the work of the Commission as a universal forum that gives all States the opportunity to participate in the discussion of questions relating to disarmament and to elaborate basic principles and recommendations concerning this issue. An undoubted success of the Commission in the last two years has been its adoption of documents on such problems as objective information on military questions and regional disarmament.

It is indisputable that there have recently been successes in the field of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. Equally indisputable is the fact that new

problems have arisen recently relating to the growth of militant nationalism, with armed conflicts entailing the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons.

There can be no doubt that the continuing reduction of nuclear arsenals is a priority disarmament question, as is the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime regarding weapons of mass destruction and the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Belarus is contributing to the best of its ability to the cause of disarmament and arms limitation by pursuing a consistent and constructive course in this field. I should like to refer to specific facts in this regard. The Republic of Belarus has set itself the goal of achieving the status of a nuclear-weapon-free, neutral State. That goal is set forth in the new Constitution of the Republic which was adopted by our Parliament on 15 March this year. In April 1992 the withdrawal from our territory of all tactical nuclear weapons was concluded ahead of time. Last year our country ratified the strategic arms limitation treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to it and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Thus, for the first time in the history of the international community, a State voluntarily renounced its opportunity to possess nuclear weapons.

Belarus favours the indefinite, unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, as well as the speedy conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In this context, we welcome the accession of Kazakhstan and Georgia to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Belarus also noted with satisfaction the joint Statement of the Presidents of the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine of 14 January 1994.

In the interests of international and regional security, non-proliferation regimes must be strengthened in all their aspects, including not only nuclear but also other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery and dual-purpose technology.

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, on behalf of a number of States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Belarus distributed as an official document our declaration on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, which states readiness to exert strict control over the export of materials and technologies which could be used to produce weapons of mass productions and the means for their delivery.

Belarus has traditionally acted as an initiator of a draft resolution on prohibiting the development and production of new mass destruction weapons and weapons systems. The resolution of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the question contains confirmation of the establishment of an agreed international procedure, making it possible to have timely control of developments concerning potential new types of weapons of mass destruction and their production and the holding of appropriate negotiations on detecting such weaponry.

Belarus is strictly complying with its obligations under international disarmament treaties, but is experiencing quite a few difficulties. In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, it will have to destroy a large number of tanks, aircraft and other military technology. Our Republic is trying, and will continue to try, to carry out its arms-reduction programme despite its extremely difficult economic situation and the problems relating to minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, which swallows up 14 per cent of the national budget yearly. We feel that arms reduction, including conventional arms reduction, should be considered an international problem and not the task of certain individual States. In this context, we would like to propose that a study be carried out in the United Nations on questions relating to the socio-economic consequences of the disarmament process for countries with economies in transition.

At this session the Commission faces a difficult task: harmonizing and adopting recommendations on two agenda items. With respect to nuclear disarmament, we have a general plan of guidelines, recommendations and governing principles as well as an informal working paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group I. We feel that the Chairman's working paper is not a bad basis for our continuing work and for agreeing on the appropriate recommendations, which should include such important questions as the need to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the strengthening of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the expansion of confidence-building measures, including guarantees for non-nuclear States.

Last year the Commission achieved significant progress in the discussion of the question of "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The working paper presented on this question is a good basis for final agreement on principles, guidelines and recommendations. Our delegation favours keeping in the text agreed provisions on such aspects of the role of science

and technology in the disarmament context as the destruction of weaponry, conversion, negotiation and monitoring of disarmament agreements, possible uses of military technology for environmental protection and sustained development. We feel the Commission should work out and adopt recommendations aimed at taking advantage of the positive potential of scientific and technological progress in the disarmament field and preventing negative consequences of scientific achievements which can seriously destabilize the international situation and undermine the atmosphere of trust among States.

The conclusion of work in the Commission on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related areas, and the subsequent adoption of appropriate recommendations at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, would also make it possible to meet the additional necessary conditions for expanding cooperation between the States concerned in the United Nations system on the problem of converting military potential to civilian needs for goals relating to sustained development. My country would be very interested indeed, for example, in participating in such an international project as scientific research work in the dual-purpose area for civilian needs, and it invites all interested States to join together and support the financing of such a project.

At this session we will also have to begin the discussion of the important and complex question of "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". We would like to express gratitude to the Colombian delegation for distributing working paper A/CN.10/184 on this question, which makes a specific, concrete contribution to discussion of this agenda item. At this session, clearly, we should limit ourselves to exchanging views on the conceptual approaches to solving this problem in a way which could promote disarmament measures and contribute to strengthening international peace and security.

In conclusion, we would like to note that our delegation intends to participate constructively in the activities of all three Working Groups and to cooperate closely with you, Sir, the other members of the Bureau and all delegations to search for mutually acceptable and effective solutions to the main items on the agenda for this session of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Chandra (India): At the outset I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. My delegation is confident that under your wise and able guidance our deliberations in the Disarmament Commission this year will be successful. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey my delegation's congratulations to the Ambassadors of Canada and Colombia, who will be chairing the Working Groups on agenda items 5 and 6. Our congratulations also go to the other newly elected members of the Bureau. We would also like to pay a warm tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil, for his leadership of the Commission last year, and to convey a special word of thanks to Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, who chaired the Working Group on regional disarmament with such distinction.

We hope that the Commission will this year capitalize on the prevailing favourable international climate and make recommendations which will help take the world decisively towards genuine and complete disarmament.

The current session of the Disarmament Commission has three items on its agenda on which deliberations will be focused: "The process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons"; "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields"; and "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991".

In respect of nuclear disarmament, I may recall that six years ago our former Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, presented to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament an Action Plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. This was inspired by the traditional Indian position, propounded by Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, that nuclear weapons were inherently evil and hence best eliminated.

The Action Plan is one of the most elaborate, consistent and coherent disarmament packages to be submitted to the United Nations. It contains a time-bound and phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It lays down obligations for all States: the two biggest military Powers, the other nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Shri Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan was propounded at the closing stages of the cold-war era. With the end of the cold war, we have witnessed changes of seismic proportions in the international political and security

environment, which have led to new imperatives for the international disarmament and security agenda. Accordingly, nuclear deterrence has lost whatever value its proponents claimed for it, and the massive nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon Powers make very little sense today.

It is therefore no surprise that significant strides have been made during the last few years in the field of nuclear disarmament. Thus, many of the targets of the Indian Action Plan envisaged during the first phase - that is, from 1988 to 1994 - have been attained. Apart from the far-reaching measures of arms reduction, both nuclear and conventional, a Treaty banning chemical weapons has already been concluded. For the first time, in 1994, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament dealing with this subject has been given a negotiating mandate, and it is currently making progress. A Special Coordinator has also been appointed in the Conference on Disarmament for the issue of prohibition on production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other explosive devices.

However, despite this progress, the international security situation is far from satisfactory. Nuclear-weapon States retain awesome arrays of nuclear weapons, enough to annihilate the world several times over. We do not think that there is any justification for retaining these weapons, and if the international community could evolve an accord to ban chemical weapons there is no reason to believe that, given the political will, it cannot achieve a similar agreement to ban nuclear weapons. Indeed, the chemical weapons Convention reflects the model for a future global nuclear-disarmament agreement, in both its multilateral negotiating format and its universal and non-discriminatory approach.

The Action Plan envisaged that on completion of stage I - reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the then-Soviet Union - other nuclear-weapon States would be inducted into the process of nuclear disarmament. Since the process of reduction in nuclear weapons by these two Powers is broadly in step with the reductions envisaged in the first phase of the Action Plan, it is only appropriate that the other nuclear-weapon States also join the process.

India has always played an active role in the discussion of disarmament issues, contributing new ideas and approaches in this regard in various international forums. Many of the items currently on the global disarmament agenda have been suggested by India, either alone or along with other non-aligned and developing countries. These include general and complete disarmament, elimination of nuclear weapons, prevention of nuclear war, a convention on forswearing the use of nuclear weapons and, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, a global freeze on the production of such weapons and weapons-grade fissile material.

We are also convinced that, given the global reach of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament can most effectively be addressed globally rather than through a regional or subregional approach. We have made this amply clear in the context of the South Asian region. Bilateral disputes in that region are also best settled bilaterally and in accordance with bilateral agreements. It is on this basis that India has sought to establish good-neighbourly relations in South Asia and has made extensive proposals, including several confidence-building measures, that, if accepted, will contribute to an easing of tensions in the region.

While we recognize that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons would take some time, it is essential that there should be a clear commitment by nuclear-weapon States to work towards this end, and within a specific time-frame. This would be the most credible confidence-building measure to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We therefore call upon the nuclear weapon States to undertake a commitment to the final elimination of nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame.

Believing that nuclear weapons are morally repugnant and noting that the end of the cold war has rendered defunct the rationale for their retention, we are convinced that these most terrible of all weapons of mass destruction must now be delegitimized. We fully realize that their complete elimination cannot be accomplished easily, quickly and cheaply, but the threat they pose could be minimized if we could place impediments in the way of their use and production. This is what commends measures such as a non-use agreement, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a universal and verifiable freeze on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, all of which would create a supportive environment for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India therefore had no hesitation in co-sponsoring at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly the consensus resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on the cut-off and in pushing for a resolution on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

We thank Ambassador Batiouk of Ukraine for his working paper on this subject, dated 18 September 1993. Our views on this subject to which we attach such great importance have already been expressed in the three

working papers we submitted on this matter at the 1992 session of the Disarmament Commission.

I should like to add that the Chair's working paper has many useful elements. We entirely agree with the notion that progress has been achieved in the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and that similar progress should be made in the field of nuclear weapons - the only means of mass destruction not yet completely banned by international agreements. We also share the conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that this notion should be formalized in a multilateral commitment, that nuclear disarmament remains one of the highest priorities in the field of arms control and disarmament and that the ultimate goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We also agree that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an important step to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We therefore look forward to working closely with all other delegations, under the guidance of Mr. Khandogy of Ukraine, to develop a consensus paper on this important subject. We should also like to congratulate Mr. Khandogy on his election to the chairmanship of the Working Group and to assure him of our fullest cooperation.

Science and technology, which should have provided the means for overcoming poverty and disease, and which can be a creative unifying force, have unfortunately been devoted to an unconscionable extent to military purposes. The self-interest of the catalytic group of the scientific-bureaucratic military-industrial complex has managed to subdue the universal concern, expressed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that along with the quantitative aspect, the qualitative aspect of the arms race must also be addressed. Meaningful disarmament cannot be achieved without addressing the problem of the qualitative arms race.

It will therefore be prudent to agree collectively on the non-pursuit of certain paths that could have a further destabilizing impact on the global security situation in the future, rendering existing arms limitations meaningless. We recognize that science and technology can also be used for disarmament purposes. We must therefore seek to ensure that scientific and technological developments are channelled exclusively in favour of peaceful purposes, including as an aid to disarmament. My delegation therefore presented a working paper on this agenda item at the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission, making concrete suggestions in this regard.

India has developed considerable expertise in nuclear, space and missile related technologies, but we have ensured that these technologies do not lead to proliferation. At the same time, we are against any ad hoc regimes or cartels which would attempt to restrict access to high technology, and believe that such measures can only lead to a new form of technological colonialism. Regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group are arbitrary, unequal and patently discriminatory. They need to be made transparent, non-discriminatory and equitable, for it is only then that they will become universal and effective. These efforts must go hand in hand with greater cooperation in the peaceful application of scientific and technological research and development in order to meet the goals of the emerging world order.

After covering much ground, last year's Disarmament Commission deliberations on science and technology came close to a successful conclusion. We hope that the remaining gaps can be bridged this year, to enable us to conclude a meaningful paper.

Turning finally to the issue of international arms transfers, we have noted that there has been an unprecedented proliferation of illicit arms, mainly in developing countries. Ethnic conflicts and cross-border terrorism have generally been facilitated by the illicit arms trade. These arms have acquired a new dimension, both in their diversity and in their sophistication. Today's illicit arms also include surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank rockets, rocket-launchers and the AK-47. There is generally a nexus between the terrorists using these arms and drug traffickers as well as gun runners, and this nexus has emerged as a potent force destabilizing societies in developing countries. We must take action to curb the menace of illicit arms transfers through specific measures: national, bilateral and international.

We would like to thank the delegation of Colombia for presenting an excellent working paper on this issue. We would like to assure it of our fullest support in all its endeavours to conclude a consensus paper successfully.

The Chairman *(interpretation from French):* I shall now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I wish first to remind members of the provisions of General Assembly decision 34/401 on rationalization of the procedures and organization of the General Assembly. That decision states that delegations should exercise their right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the

consideration of the same item, and that the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item. It states also that the first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to 5 minutes.

Mr. Li Song Jin (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I cannot but refer to the remarks of the South Korean representative, who obtrusively made the nuclear issue an object of his statement. It is the South Korean authorities that are opposing their compatriots, and playing out the scenario of nuclear suspicion concocted by the United States and putting obstacles in the way of resolving the nuclear issue.

The recent process of inter-Korean working-level contacts for the exchange of presidential envoys between the North and the South further proves that the South Korean authorities have been taking advantage of the exchange of special envoys as leverage for carrying out their insidious political purposes. The South Korean side blindly opposed the proposals of our side at the table, though it recognized their fairness and justice, and claimed outside the meeting room that the third round of talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America should not be held and that the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise would be resumed unless the exchange of special envoys were realized.

Although they have no authority with respect to resolving the nuclear issue, the South Korean authorities are running about recklessly, not knowing their position. Concurrently with the abortion of the third round of talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, because of the imposition of unreasonable preconditions by the United States, the South Korean authorities pleaded for the resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and the deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea, intensifying the situation in the Korean peninsula to an extreme, and heightening the North-South confrontation.

The South Korean authorities are not interested in the fate of the nation or the exchange of presidential envoys. They are attempting to block the resolution of the nuclear issue by putting a brake - at any cost - on the negotiations between the DPRK and the United States. If the South Korean authorities had any interest at all in resolving the nuclear issue, they would have refrained from placing obstacles in the way, even if they would not lend their support. Opening the way to resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula through good results of talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States would be beneficial for the entire Korean nation. It would be good for the South Korean side too.

It is no secret that the South Korean authorities are developing nuclear weapons under the patronage of the United States and some Western European countries. They have already stored a quantity of plutonium; they have concluded a contract with the United Kingdom and France for the import of plutonium; and recently they launched their own heavy-water reactors. The South Korean authorities are afraid that a package solution for the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, through the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, would lead to revealing their nuclear development. This would bring about international condemnation, to say nothing of the condemnation of the entire Korean people, of their violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean authorities must discard their wild ambition to develop nuclear weapons under a super-Power's nuclear umbrella, and taking advantage of the double standards applied by the Western countries. I urge the South Korean authorities to make a frank declaration of their nuclear development and to accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, if they truly want peace and the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. I also advise them to give up adventurous, provocative attempts against their fellow countrymen, relying on foreign forces. They should, rather, act in favour of the interests of the nation, in a spirit of national independence.

The Chairman *(interpretation from French)*: I wish to thank the interpreters, whose time we have taken, for their patience.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.